Institute for Regional Studies of the Californias

Impacts and Undocumented Persons: The Quest for Useable Data in San Diego County, 1974-1986

by Joseph Naiven

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IMPACTS AND UNDOCUMENTED PERSONS:
THE QUEST FOR USEABLE DATA IN SAN DIEGO COUNTY
1974-1986

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INTRODUCTION

No one can predict how effective Congress's immigration reform will be, if and when such legislation is finally passed. The national uncertainty straddles several major questions: Will the integrity of the national boundaries be protected? Can U.S. labor be protected while, at the same time, protecting affected industries, particularly agriculture? To what extent will state and local governments be reimbursed for impacts on community services? How many undocumented persons will be legalized? Will the undocumented and those receiving amnesty be protected from rights and labor standard abuses?

Federal legislation requires a national policy on these issues. Regional differences, however, provide a distinct counterpoint. The border region permits greater access to residents of neighboring countries and thereby experiences greater use of local facilities, resulting in both positive and negative impacts. Fiscal impact arguments have been raised chiefly by state and local governments in the Southwest and Florida. Labor market impacts are also sensitive to regional differences across individual industries.

In this regard, each region should understand how immigration, both legal and undocumented, affects its development. The federal government should also be able to distinguish national from regional impacts. This is no mean feat. It presumes well developed statistical information, including demographic, economic, and facility utilization data. It presumes an ability to analyze effects by comparing immigrant to non-immigrant residents. Finally, it presumes an ability to relate immigration impacts across different levels of aggregation, from local and regional levels to the national level.
At present, we have no definitive analysis of immigration impacts, either at a local, regional, or national level. Nevertheless, there have been important benchmark studies which have sought to approximate the nature and degree of undocumented immigrant impacts, particularly in fiscal and labor market terms. San Diego County has been the subject of several such studies, most of which have been funded, not surprisingly, by the County itself.

This paper will examine impacts of undocumented immigrants on a single Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), San Diego County. The policy questions and findings span a dozen years, 1974 to 1986. Special emphasis will be devoted to the way in which research and policy assumptions act as "blinders," often leading to a simplistic view of the impacts of undocumented persons.

ON MAKING IMPACT ASSESSMENTS

The most recent and dedicated national overview of immigration policy in the United States was concluded in 1981 under the direction of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy. This effort addressed the problem of economic impact assessment by first deciding not to commission any impact studies and, secondly, by concluding that non-economic factors had overriding importance in curtailing the flow of undocumented immigrants to the United States. The Executive Director of the Select Commission, Lawrence Fuchs, recounted the decision not to attempt a comprehensive, final set of answers to the questions of labor market impacts.... In the first place, it was important to synthesize and digest the work already done. Secondly, there was no reason to expect that additional work would be conclusive in the time allotted to the Select Commission, and even if the Commission had an additional year or two, it would not have been possible to get a representative sample of this unusually diverse population to yield the kind of compelling answers that policymakers sought.(2)
It is important to underline Fuchs' last point. Because statistically compelling results within the normal approach to survey research were virtually impossible, the research avenue to assess the impacts of undocumented persons was abandoned.

The conclusions of the Select Commission's staff report are somewhat ironic in light of their de-emphasis of economic consequences. The prophecy has been fulfilled: Abandonment of impact research has left them little information on economic factors with which to make policy judgments. Instead, their recommendation to curtail undocumented immigration is based on the dual objectives of protecting undocumented immigrants from life in the U.S. as a permanent underclass and of minimizing any negative effects their presence would have on the social values of U.S. citizens. It is for these reasons and "not because undocumented/illegal activity harm U.S. economic growth and productivity" that future undocumented immigration should be curtailed.(3) This same attitude is probably a key to why the Select Commission ignored local level arguments claiming a fiscal burden due to undocumented persons' use of local services.

Because of this missing piece in the immigration puzzle, the Congressional Research Service prepared a report on the impact of illegal immigration at the request of the House of Representatives' Committee on the Judiciary. The report did not emerge from any single national study, but sought instead to summarize the burgeoning literature on local and regional immigration impacts. The conclusions of the report reinforce the difficulties in fine tuning immigration reform. In essence, policy makers are told that there appears to be some localized job displacement of citizens and legal residents by undocumented workers as well as some increases in the costs of public services, but that such impacts have resisted exact measurement on a national scale and are impossible to
predict. (4)

If attempts to generalize the negative effects of undocumented immigration at the national level have fallen short, partly because of the variation between regions within the United States, a more promising approach might result by focusing on one community that has been the subject of a series of overlapping studies. The strengths and pitfalls of arriving at a comprehensive view in a smaller and more tangible area may shed some light on the elusive goal of impact analysis at the national level. San Diego County not only meets this criterion, but it is the only area studied with the aid of a regional simulation model to develop an economy wide analysis. (Research and documentary reports on San Diego County are listed in Appendix 1.)

QUESTIONS FROM THE COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS

From mid-1970 to mid-1980, the County of San Diego's interest in immigration issues can be traced. On August 20, 1974, the San Diego County Board of Supervisors created the San Diego County Immigration Council/Immigration Task Force to "ascertain the socioeconomic impact of non-resident aliens on the County of San Diego." (5) At the same time, a letter from a County of Los Angeles Supervisor to the Chairman of San Diego's Board of Supervisors signalled a specific concern for medical care costs and a desire to institute regional legal action against the Federal government:

California counties, because of their proximity to the international border, are experiencing heavy losses of taxpayer dollars in rendering medical care to indigent illegal aliens.

My purpose in writing to you is not to quarrel with the humanitarian aspect of providing such service; it is the moral obligation of all involved in government to do so. I am concerned, however, with the question of who has the ultimate responsibility of paying for those services?
I believe it belongs to the federal government, which is also responsible for controlling the flow of immigrants, legal or illegal, into California....

I hope your Board of Supervisors will join us in soliciting a collective stance with the County Supervisors' Association of California in an aggressive effort to influence Federal authorities to remedy an ever-increasing tax burden to local government for the provision of human services to aliens unlawfully in the United States.(6)

By July 1975, the San Diego County Board of Supervisors extended their interest in understanding the impacts of non-resident aliens by commissioning a "Non-Resident Alien Impact Study." This study addressed two major concerns: "(1) the impact on non-resident aliens, economically and socially, on selected government and private agencies within the County and, (2) the socioeconomic issues affecting aliens."

It is interesting to compare the specific concerns the County Board of Supervisors raised in the first (1975), second (1977), and third (1980) studies (see Figure 1). While the overall thrust is similar in each of these studies, there are distinct emphases. In the first study, policy and definitional issues compete with statistical issues. In the second study, institutional and community concerns compete with statistical concerns. In the third study, the concerns are narrowed to strictly empirical measures. There, the Board of Supervisors sought answers about the number of undocumented workers in different industries; the extent of job displacement; the economic impact of undocumented workers; fiscal impacts in health, education, welfare, and law enforcement; and economic interdependence between San Diego and Tijuana. The impacts are more precisely defined by the third study. Also, with the third study, the Board of Supervisors empanelled a Border Task Force that was charged with exploring the policy dimensions of immigration.(7)

Just after the completion of the 1977 study, the Board of Supervisors called on the presidents of the United States and Mexico, the governors of
Figure 1

A Comparison of Immigration Policy Objectives
in County of San Diego Studies

1975

1. Determining the policies used by hospitals and clinics, school districts, the County Department of Public Welfare, law enforcement agencies, the Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS), and other public and private agencies in handling the issues of illegal aliens,

2. Calculating the economic and social impact of legal and illegal aliens on the County based on available demographic data, social indicators and other statistical data projected on commercial trends,

3. Documenting the various classifications of aliens and noting restrictions of their status and their rights under the law,

4. Identifying whatever statistical data is available from public and private organizations regarding illegal aliens, and

5. Expressing the life-style ramifications for illegal aliens living or working in the United States.

Source: A Study of the Impact of Illegal Aliens on the County of San Diego on Specific Socioeconomic Areas, Human Resources Agency, County of San Diego, 1975, pp. 18-19.

1977

1. To establish a demographic profile on the illegal alien population residing in the County of San Diego, and to determine their relative socio-economic impact on San Diego in such areas as immigration, welfare, education, health care, law enforcement, employment and labor;

2. To ascertain the feelings of the Chicano community on the issue of illegal aliens;

3. To identify the numerous public and private agencies and groups in the County of San Diego that have contact with the illegal alien;

4. To make recommendations to the Board of Supervisors, and as a result of the study;

5. To establish a working relationship between the impacted government agencies and community groups, for the purpose of seeking appropriate solutions to the illegal alien issue.

Source: Impact of Illegal Aliens on the County of San Diego, Human Resources Agency, County of San Diego, 1977, pp. 5-6.

1979*

1. The magnitude of undocumented workers in San Diego's labor force by type of industry.

2. Job displacement by undocumented workers of individuals legally entitled to work in the United States.

3. The economic impact (including tax contributions) of undocumented workers on San Diego County.

4. Fiscal impact of undocumented immigrants on health care, welfare, education, and law enforcement agencies.

5. The extent of economic interdependence between San Diego and Tijuana and how this may be fostered to the benefit of the local communities.


* The objectives were adopted in 1979 by the Board of Supervisors and served as the basis for the study published in 1980.
California and Baja California, the mayors of San Diego and Tijuana, and its Washington lobbyist, to urge "Congress to enact legislation providing for federal reimbursement for emergency medical services provided to non-resident aliens. (See copy of resolution in Appendix 2.)(8)

The appeal to Congress proved to be inadequate, and two years later the County of San Diego filed a lawsuit against the federal government. The lawsuit sought monetary reimbursement for providing medical care to undocumented individuals as well as:

an injunction against the government from failing to take into custody and provide medical care for illegal aliens for whom the County incurs health care costs, from failing to reimburse the County for the costs it has incurred, and from enforcing the provisions of an administrative regulation which directs the Immigration and Naturalization Service to take physical custody of institutionalized illegal aliens only when deportation is imminent. Also requested is a writ of mandamus compelling the individual defendants to perform their statutory duties and a declaration of the District Court that the Federal Government has the duty to provide the health care to the illegal aliens, that the Federal Government had failed to perform its statutory duties, that the administrative regulation mentioned is unlawful [8 C.F.R. Section 242.3 stating that costs shall not be borne by the United States until INS assumes actual physical custody] and that the Federal Government must reimburse the County for its expenditures for the health care services delivered to such aliens within its jurisdiction.(9)

The lawsuit ultimately failed. The case was dismissed on February 6, 1980, and subsequently denied by the U.S. Court of Appeal, October 16, 1981, and by the Supreme Court, March 22, 1982.(10)

The judicial rebuff left the Supervisors little choice but to pursue a legislative solution at the federal level. Moreover, during the early 1980s while Congress was debating immigration reform three thousand miles away, the attention of San Diego officials was drawn to the equally perplexing border problem of sewage spilling over from Tijuana into San Diego. However, by 1985-86, with the sewage issue apparently solved, each of the Supervisors began turning his or her attention back to the immigration debate. Their views recapitulate the theme of the need for federal action. The consensus position is one of requesting fiscal
reimbursement for the costs of undocumented immigration. Other recommendations, however, reveal differences in approach, particularly on the issue of militarizing the border to stem the flow of undocumented persons entering the County of San Diego across its southern border with Mexico and on how to track the costs of undocumented persons without penalizing these individuals in the process of identification. The variety of involvement of the five County Supervisors with the immigration issue is quite illuminating.

Supervisor Bailey, also Chairman of the County's Criminal Justice Council, hosted a briefing for Senator Wilson and the members of San Diego's Congressional delegation in August 1985 to discuss the growing costs of undocumented aliens in the criminal justice system. The summary report states that aliens (legal and illegal) from the Middle East, Central America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and Mexico represent 25 percent of all the persons in the criminal justice system. Beyond curtailing immigration, the Council recommended financial assistance to an automated fingerprint system for ease of identification, the improvement of roads and fencing along the border, and impact financial assistance for interpreters, attorneys, detention facilities, and enforcement when the percentage of undocumented persons in the criminal justice system exceeds 5 percent. (11) (The criminal justice data will be discussed below in the following section.)

Supervisor Williams represented the National Association of Counties before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law, U.S. House of Representatives, in September 1985. He pointed out that local and state governments face the dilemma of how to continue to provide many human care services in the face of substantial federal cuts in assistance. In this context, the added costs that will arise from the
legalization of undocumented persons may prove a significant burden on local governments. Williams notes:

The problem is that no one knows the costs. Anyone can make their best guesses on the number of illegal aliens in the country, the number that would apply for legalization and be accepted, and the cost of health, welfare and social services used by the newly legalized. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) had a figure of $6.7 billion. A David Stockman memo in early 1984 estimated costs of $10.1 billion to $13.3 billion. Still another study estimated a new cost of $1.23 billion a year per one million illegal aliens. The Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) estimates of public assistance costs in this year's Senate's bill totaled $475 million for the first 3 years, with an additional $225 million a year after fiscal 1991. Each group has a cost estimate—-but the point is—-no one knows the true costs....

Because of the hazy numbers, the wide range of cost estimates, the lack of solid State estimates, and past and possibly future federal cuts in state and local assistance, NACo supports a time-limited, cost reimbursement approach to legalization. Although the authorization language of "such sums as may be necessary" in H.R. 3080 seemingly responds to our concerns, we still support the 100 percent reimbursement approach of last year's House bill.(12)

 Supervisor Bilbray testified before the California Assembly Intergovernmental Relations Committee in November 1985, affirming that San Diego County "experiences the heaviest flow of immigration both legal and illegal, of any international border in the world." Bilbray highlighted the impacts in the areas of social services, health services, and the criminal justice system.(13)

 Supervisor Eckert, in a televised forum during his unsuccessful bid in seeking re-election in May 1986, stated that he favored deploying Marines along the border as part of a policing action: "I think we're going to take a very, very strong position to close the border ... to illegal aliens."(14)

 Supervisor Golding synthesized the interests expressed by her colleagues in a five-part proposal to the Board of Supervisors in June 1986. The Supervisors agreed with Golding to direct the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) to determine "the full cost of County
services provided to undocumented immigrants," examine ways to obtain "impact assistance" from the federal government, develop litigation strategy as a fallback position to once again sue the federal government, and to seek the support of other local jurisdictions in pursuing such a lawsuit.

The County of Board of Supervisors were not alone among local elected officials in addressing the issues surrounding undocumented immigration. For example, at the City of San Diego, Deputy Mayor Struiksma's staff identified two types of impacts for discussion for the FY 1986-87 budget hearings: The fiscal cost of $365,000 to fund a Border Crime Prevention Unit and the social cost, particularly discrimination, to individuals of Latino heritage as a result of selective enforcement procedures. In general, however, it was the County Supervisors who spearheaded the region's discussion and debate on these issues.

The inability of federal legislators to pass immigration reform from the moment the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy completed its work in 1981 through mid-1986 has proved to be a major source of frustration to local officials. The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, after receiving testimony from local governments, recommended only that their financial burden be eased with respect to refugees--no vote was taken on the financial burden that may occur with undocumented immigrants.(15) Some recognition was given to this issue with the passage of S.2222 in 1982 (but without a successful companion bill in the House of Representatives). The Senate proposed a six year block aid program for states to help with medical assistance for those aliens who would be eligible for legalization. The 1983 Senate version, S.529, carried this provision forward.(16) The 1985 Senate version, S. 1200, maintained a "capped entitlement" approach, authorizing $300 million for
the first two fiscal years and $600 million for the following four fiscal years to cover the costs of public assistance and imprisonment of aliens.(17) From the viewpoint of the National Association of Counties (NACo), only full reimbursement for the costs of legalization would be satisfactory. NACo argued that the adoption of that language in the 1984 House version should be reinserted into H.R. 3080 (1985), instead of the vague terminology "such sums as may be necessary."(18) H.R. 3080 has been since superseded by H.R. 3810.

Because all the proposed legislative options are tied to a cutoff point beyond which undocumented immigrants will not be able to obtain amnesty (generally set from 1980 to 1982), the result will be that whatever legislation is passed it will merely reduce the number of undocumented persons in the United States. Thus, it is likely that impacts at the local level will persist and reassert themselves over time unless other measures can successfully de-magnetize the U.S. as a pole of attraction to undocumented persons.

METHODS AND THE NUMBERS QUEST

In order to illustrate the difficulty of providing adequate information to policy makers, two contrasting approaches can be imagined.
[1] The problem is 'X' big; it costs 'Y' dollars; and it requires actions 'p,' 'q,' and 'r';

[2] The problem is about 'X' big, derived from method 'Q'; it costs about 'Y' dollars, which may be more or less depending on the validity of method 'Q'; and the actions taken may have a positive or negative effect depending how accurately we are measuring the problem in relation to the wider context.

The undocumented immigrant issue has frequently been a contest within and
between these approaches. At one level, we find researchers employing different methods. The recurrent question is whether the resulting measures simply reflect differences in methodology or actually reflect differences in absolute numbers or in rates of change of undocumented immigration. At another level, generally in policy debates, we find the consumers of research findings attempting to force absolute numbers out of a murky phenomenon in order to develop a clear policy direction.(19)

At some point, inferences may be carefully drawn. One approach is to simply acknowledge the numbers problem and to press forward with a summation of the various impacts.(20) Instead, the thrust here is to pinpoint several key data gaps and follow the different approaches employed by researchers focusing on San Diego in developing their "findings," and how these in turn have supported various policy recommendations.

A useful way of dividing research on undocumented immigrants is to separate the studies which limit their conclusions to the selected sample from those which attempt to generalize their findings. A second consideration is to examine the unit of analysis. Is the focus of the study on the individual, the institution, or the community? These methodological distinctions are important for evaluating the inference value of statements made about undocumented individuals. For example, one can only infer the characteristics of apprehended undocumented persons from a study population or "sample" drawn solely from INS 213 forms—a government form that is used to describe an individual apprehended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and U.S. Border Patrol for being unlawfully present in the United States. One cannot infer the total number of undocumented immigrants from such a study population, nor rely on the characteristics of this group of apprehended individuals as an accurate description of the undocumented population living in the United States.(21)
By contrast, an approach which simulates a population universe of undocumented immigrants can employ these data in forecasting the extent of impacts upon various sectors of the economy and government transfer payments. The critical issue in a simulation is how well anchored the simulation is to the study population. The first two County studies (1975, 1977) relied exclusively on regional population estimates of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. While these estimates can also be used to estimate total regional impacts, the utility of the estimates is directly dependent on this single data source. By contrast, the 1980 County of San Diego study actually simulated high and low estimates of the undocumented population by surveying different samples with varying relationships to demographic and economic aspects of the County of San Diego.

The types of questions that are asked about the impacts of undocumented persons are focused on individuals, institutions, and the wider society:

A) **Individual.** What jobs are undocumented workers likely to hold? What health problems do they encounter compared to citizens and legal immigrants?

B) **Institution.** What percentage of school children or hospital patients are undocumented individuals? What fiscal costs does this rate of utilization represent to school districts or hospitals?

C) **Society- and economy-wide.** What system-wide effects can be determined by examining the inter-relationships of demographic, economic, and social processes over time? Given, for example, the labor-force participation rates of undocumented workers and their wage levels, to what extent would legally available workers "take" jobs held by undocumented workers, and, if not, what effects would this have on the affected industry? What further effect does the "taking" of jobs by undocumented workers have on increased transfer payments, such as unemployment insurance and food stamps?
Further, how many jobs are created by undocumented workers by their
expenditures in the local economy?

Given this frame of reference, let us examine "findings" from studies
conducted with reference to San Diego County that have significant
relevance to the discussion about the impacts of undocumented immigration.
These findings include: 1) the number of undocumented immigrants and
workers in San Diego County; 2) impact on the criminal justice system and
the problem of selective (racial) enforcement; 3) health profile; 4) fiscal
impact on schools and hospitals; 5) welfare impacts; 6) housing impacts;
7) tax contributions and per capita subventions; and 8) labor market impacts.

1) The Number of Undocumented Immigrants and Workers in San Diego County.

The overall Hispanic population and the small segment of undocumented
Hispanics seemed to have behaved like a roller coaster: The percentage of
Hispanics in San Diego went from 6.3 percent in 1960, to 12.8 percent in
1970, back down to 7.4 percent in 1975, and then up again to 14.8 percent
in 1980. During this period there were no catastrophic movements of people
to suggest that these population shifts were factual. The change in the
percentage and absolute number of Hispanics in San Diego had as much to do
with the definitions and procedures used to count them as with their
overall growth in the region. Some identification elements include use of
mother tongue spoken in the home, surname, counts by observation and by
self identification, the number of persons for which ethnicity was not
reported, and whether the children of inter-ethnic marriages are to be
counted with the father or with the mother.

The counts of undocumented Hispanics, primarily of Mexican origin, have
behaved in similar fashion: from 50,000 in 1975, to 92,138 in 1977, to a
range between 24,665 and 48,362 in 1979; to 50,000 in 1980; to 60,000 in
1984; and to 88,000 in 1986 (see Figure 2). Again, the movement of the undocumented population does not seem to have behaved as suggested by a naive acceptance of these counts. Here, the identification of "undocumented individuals" is more complex than that of "Hispanics." For many, the distinctions are too subtle between "Americans of Mexican descent," "Mexican Americans," "Chicanos," "Permanent Resident of Mexican Origin," "Commuter Worker of Mexican Origin," "Mexicanos lawfully present in the United States with an I-94, I-444, or I-586," on the one hand, and "EWIs (entered without inspection)" and "Visa Abusers" (especially those with "local passports"), on the other hand. The result is often a simplification of all of the above into "Mexican." This simplification has the result of reports to INS of individuals who "look like illegal aliens from Mexico." It is also one of the root causes for Hispanic leadership opposition to the employer sanctions element of the proposed Simpson-Mazzoli immigration reforms: Employers would, based on "simple human nature," give undue scrutiny to and discriminate against Hispanics who "look" undocumented. To ensure an even handed application of employer sanctions additional fines on employers who discriminate on the basis of alienage may be required.(22)

If researchers who claim a special wisdom about the finer points of ethnicity and lawful immigration status in the United States seek to count "undocumented" persons, the critical question is how can they do so, given the general observation that these individuals prefer to keep their legal status private? If anything, making their immigration status public creates a deportation risk.
Figure 2
Comparison of the Number and Earnings of Undocumented Persons
(San Diego County)

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<td>County</td>
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<td>Community Research Associates</td>
<td>Census Bureau</td>
<td>GAO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of</td>
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<td>92,138</td>
<td>24,164 - 48,362</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>88,000</td>
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<td>Undocumented</td>
<td>9,000</td>
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<td>Undocumented</td>
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<td>Workers</td>
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<td>Total Earnings</td>
<td>34.6</td>
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* The 1980 County study based its calculations on 1979 data.

The 1975 and 1977 County of San Diego in-house studies, as noted previously, relied exclusively on the INS regional estimates. The INS estimate for San Diego in 1975 was 50,000 undocumented persons with 9,000 of these holding jobs in San Diego. The INS went through a process of upward revision and gave a 1977 estimate for the San Diego-Imperial Counties district of 184,275. The County researchers proceeded to split this estimate in half, assuming that the large population of illegal aliens that San Diego attracts because of its high percent of industry is equaled by the great agricultural attraction of the Imperial Valley. Best source estimates, therefore, indicate that the 92,138 illegal alien population estimated for the San Diego area and the 92,137 estimate determined for the Imperial County area are "reasonable."(23)

A study conducted by the Southwest Border Regional Commission, using INS 213 forms, questioned the half-half split employed by the 1977 County of San Diego study. Inasmuch as the Commission's study took "a sample
proportional to the number of undocumented immigrants apprehended in each county," it concluded by stating that "this study indicates that the employment is not equally divided between Imperial and San Diego counties. A much greater proportion (79.3 percent) of undocumented workers in this sample were employed in San Diego County."(24) Because the sampling approach was biased towards apprehensions made in San Diego County, it would appear that the Commission's report can only claim that the INS and the U.S. Border Patrol apprehended more workers in San Diego than in Imperial County. In both studies, though, the limits of validity are restricted to forms which INS officials state are collected to management, not research standards. A greater problem with the half-half split is that it allocated Imperial County nearly as many undocumented persons as there were people living there. Planners and census takers have missed undocumented persons, but a nearly 100 percent oversight is unlikely(25); furthermore, the original researchers have since accepted the faux pas in not paying attention to Imperial County demographics.(26)

The 1980 County study took a radically different approach. There, the assumption was made that undocumented individuals could be counted through 1) an understanding of their labor force participation and 2) an understanding of the San Diego family size of these workers. Thus, for example, if one knows the number of undocumented workers in agriculture and if one knows the size of the family that is here with that worker, discounting U.S.-born children and controlling for multiple wage earners, one can estimate both the number of undocumented farm workers as well as the total undocumented immigrant population that is tied to San Diego through agriculture. The same is true for non-agriculture labor force participants.

This approach depends on being able to derive a reasonable range of
labor force participation by Standard Industrial Classification (S.I.C.)
categories. It depends on there being a negligible number of undocumented
persons in the region who are not tied to the labor force, such as
unemployed undocumented workers as well as those who are receiving income
transfer payments and are not detected through County screening procedures.
Since the County of San Diego has been acutely aware of fiscal impacts
through social services to undocumented individuals, especially since its
1975 study, the number of undocumented persons who may have escaped the
labor force estimation strategy by being on welfare is minimal. (27)
However, no attempt was made to estimate unemployment among the San Diego
undocumented population. Furthermore, the estimation of labor force
participation by S.I.C. categories by building on the pattern discerned in
earlier studies, particularly the Southwest Border Regional Commission
study (1978), assumed a concentration of the undocumented labor force in
five major industrial sectors (agriculture, construction, manufacturing,
retail, and services), covering 28 separate two-digit categories. To the
extent that there was significant low level participation outside these
industrial classifications, such as in government employment, then to the
same extent this strategy missed undocumented persons in San Diego.
Knowledge of the undocumented population in San Diego suggests that these
assumptions are "reasonable," but, as in each of the preceding studies, the
assumptions upon which the numbers rest need to be repeatedly tested until
normal survey techniques can be employed, preempting indirect approaches.
The estimation process in the 1980 study built on surveys of apprehended
undocumented persons, non-apprehended undocumented persons, Silva-Bell
petitioners, unemployed individuals at state employment offices, employers,
as well as INS and Border Patrol agents. (Silva-Bell petitioners were
individuals who were present in the U.S. illegally, but were potential
recipients of visa numbers that the Department of State and INS had given to Cuban refugees against the quotas for Western Hemisphere countries. Some 1,800 Silva-Bell individuals were on file in the San Diego INS office in 1980.) A Delphi approach, which combines estimates of experts where exact measures are unavailable, was used to develop labor force participation estimates in the targeted S.I.C. categories. A further discussion of the estimation techniques to simulate the undocumented population can be found in "Undocumented Immigrants: Their Impact on the County of San Diego."(28)

The U.S. Bureau of the Census released estimates of undocumented immigrants for SMSAs, consistent with previous state estimates.(29) The Los Angeles-Long Beach SMSA had nearly one-third of all undocumented immigrants in the United States for 1980 (658,000). San Diego County was eighth highest in the United States with 50,000 undocumented persons, 69 percent of whom were born in Mexico.(30) The methodology used by the Bureau of the Census manipulated data drawn from the 1980 census as well as estimates of legally resident aliens from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.(31) As such, this residual approach does not yield specific labor force data, nor specific demographic data beyond age and gender breakdowns. The data do not fully capture the seasonal farm labor flow since the count was made on April 1, at a time before the undocumented farm labor from Mexico peaks.

While one cannot expect San Diego's microcosm to reflect the national picture, it is interesting to note the similarity between the profile of the undocumented population at both levels. The San Diego estimate found 13.2 percent of the population to be 35 and over, while the national estimate was 13.7 percent. The undocumented male population in San Diego was 55 percent, while 57 percent at the national level. The San Diego
estimate, however, was higher for the under 14 group with 28.4 percent—about 6 percent higher than the national estimate. (32)

The California State Department of Finance has developed annual estimates of additional numbers of undocumented immigrants coming to California counties since 1980. The starting point used by the Department of Finance is allocating undocumented persons between 18 and 64 years old to California counties, some 4,400 to San Diego County. (33) The 4,400 figure can go higher or lower depending on other data used for adjusting the state's population. If the 4,400 figure is used, there has been an increase of 25,300 undocumented persons in San Diego County since the 1980 census (representing 5.75 years through January 1986).

The Department of Finance's estimate does not directly identify undocumented persons under 18 or over 64. Undocumented children, for example, are indirectly incorporated into the department's figures through school enrollment data; however, these children are not identified by lawful immigration status. By utilizing the population data developed by Community Research Associates for the 1980 County study, approximately another one-third could be added to the 4,400—or, an annual increase closer to 6,600. (See Appendix 3.) This annual rate would bring the total increase since the 1980 census closer to 38,000. Added to the 1980 estimate of 50,000, a composite estimate of undocumented immigrants for San Diego County would be about 88,000 through January 1986. (34)

An alternative approach might be to adopt the General Accounting Office's estimate of 60,000 undocumented persons in 1984. (35) If the same growth rate is projected through 1986, San Diego would have an estimated 66,000 undocumented persons. Thus, a reasonable estimate of undocumented persons in San Diego County for 1986 would range between 66,000 and 88,000.
2) **Victims of Crime, Criminal Suspects, and the Problem of Selective (Racial) Enforcement**

The impact of undocumented individuals on the criminal justice system is currently the most explosive issue in the immigration debate. The impacts are not merely fiscal, but affect people in very direct ways. The image of the undocumented is central as to how this impact will be perceived by the general population. Is the undocumented person here chiefly seeking a honest day's work, and whose involvement in crime is primarily that of a victim? Is the involvement of undocumented persons in the commission of crimes the exception, or is it similar to the general population or to those of the same socio-economic background, and is that involvement at a rate less than or greater than other segments of the population? Any finding, no matter how exact, must contend with the potential reaction of an exaggerated fear and stigmatizing of all those who "look" undocumented, namely, the person of Latino origin.

The San Diego Association of Governments (SANDAG) has received a two-year grant from the National Institute of Justice to conduct an inquiry into the involvement of undocumented persons in felony offenses. This study will compare the outcome of these arrest cases to others arrested for similar offenses and will calculate the fiscal cost and workload increases associated with these arrests, and will document the extent of inter-agency coordination. The study will draw a sample of about 10,000 felony arrests made in San Diego County between July 1, 1985 and June 30, 1986. The study, to be completed in the fall of 1988, will also compare San Diego and El Paso Counties.(36) The study does not plan to address the extent to which undocumented persons are victims of crimes or the extent to which the victims of crimes committed by undocumented persons are other undocumented persons.
The SANDAG study has highlighted the importance of correctly identifying the undocumented person. The San Diego region enters its arrest and crime data into a computerized information system, Automated Regional Justice Information System (ARJIS), and has now expanded its information categories to include undocumented persons (UP).(37) With respect to the UP category, the overriding question is the accuracy of identification by the arresting officer. If the arresting officer is not cross-trained by INS, has no access to the INS identification system, or if the arresting officer's initial identification is not subsequently verified by INS, the UP data will have an unknown degree of validity.(38)

In August 1986, the City of San Diego Police Department, under pressure from Hispanic groups, reversed its policy of having officers fill out the UP box on arrest forms.(39) Herman Baca, of the Committee on Chicano Rights, voiced the opinion that this practice would have resulted in "a racial vendetta against every person of Mexican ancestry." Speaking for the Police Department, Manuel Guaderrama said, "Now that we've taken a good look at it, we could see the room for error and the need to re-examine the fairness. We've decided that that is not the kind of information we want to be involved in."(40) Despite the policy reversal, the Police Department did identify undocumented persons as part of an increase in local crime (no specific numbers included in the report):

The impact of undocumented aliens, along with that of an increased number of transients, upon street crimes is becoming more pronounced. A hard core of aliens use public transportation to commit crimes in all parts of the City. It is relatively easy for certain criminals to take the bus to more affluent areas, accomplish a burglary and return by bus.(41)

There are available statistical data concerning the arrests of undocumented persons, but only qualitative reports on their being victims of crime. The 1977 County study devoted one-fourth of its report to "the
impact of illegal aliens on San Diego County law enforcement agencies."(42) The report noted that 546 County jail bookings in 1975 were illegal aliens with an average stay period of 18 days and with a total incarceration cost impact of $114,398. The five leading arrest categories were: auto theft (24.5 percent); driving under the influence of alcohol (19.6 percent); petty theft (13.2 percent); burglary 13 percent); and possession of marijuana (12.6 percent).(43) A better sense of crime data would, of course, be a comparison of arrest and conviction data. The 1977 County study looked at 10 percent of these cases to determine their disposition. Of the 10 percent (52 cases) sampled, 32.7 percent were sentenced; 30.8 percent were dismissed; 11.5 percent were released on their own recognizance; 9.6 percent received a suspended sentence; 5.8 percent were fined; 5.8 percent were released to other enforcement agencies; and 3.8 percent received a stay of execution.(44)

The 1980 County study was largely unable to update the 1977 County study because of an increased reluctance of local enforcement agencies to identify by immigration status those arrested.(45) However, the County Probation Department maintained immigration status records for juveniles. In 1979, 156 illegal alien youths were admitted to Juvenile Hall with an average stay of 13 days and at a total cost of $124,751, including the cost of detention, intake, and investigation.(46)

In 1985, local law enforcement agencies began reporting estimates of arrests of undocumented persons. The City of San Diego, for example, reviewed all bookings for 1985 using four criteria to determine whether the person was undocumented. These included: person was born outside the U.S.; person lacked a social security card; person lacked a driver's license; and person had no local address.(47) Relying primarily on these four criteria, the analysis of booking reports suggested that 12 percent
(2,084) of all felony arrests were undocumented aliens, with 23 percent being for auto thefts and 26 percent for burglary.

The Sheriff's office examined data from its Vista and Fallbrook substations, indicating that alien arrests totaled 30.5 percent of all arrests for state law violations for FY 1984/85. Subsequent interviewing by San Clemente Border Patrol officers at the Vista Jail revealed that 47.8 percent of those arrested were undocumented persons (from November 30, 1985 through January 27, 1986).(48) The report indicates that there is an impact of undocumented aliens on the criminal justice system. However, the numbers and percentages resist precision inasmuch as those identified as suspected undocumented aliens by the arresting officer may not, in fact, be undocumented as determined by a Border Patrol or INS agent.

Further discussions with a Border Patrol interviewing agent suggest that two different methods may have been employed in the preceding data. In continuing Border Patrol interviews at the Vista Jail, the agent reported that he first picked out everyone who stated that he or she was born outside the United States. Subsequent interviews by the agent revealed that about two-thirds of this group were indeed undocumented.(49) It is unclear whether those identified by arresting officers in the Sheriff's report were the same as those culled out by the Border Patrol agent. If these two sets of identifications were independent, and if (as both INS and local enforcement officials report) individuals are more likely to be honest about their immigration status to police than to INS, then the FY 84/85 data may be more accurate than it appears from a strict reading of the Sheriff's report. The Border Patrol agent stated that an analysis of 208 "holds" from April 27 to May 27, 1986 revealed a similar pattern for alien arrests, with the four largest categories being drunk in public (29.3 percent), driving under the influence (24.5 percent), unlawful
taking of vehicle (10.1 percent), and burglary (8.7 percent).(50)

The volatile aspect of these data was demonstrated when one County Supervisor mistakenly used data from the Vista and Fallbrook substations and applied it to all of San Diego County in an attempt to call attention to the cost impact on County services. The 8 alien arrests out of a total of 13 arrests for rape in the Vista/Fallbrook area took on far greater significance when projected to the total County. One Chicano leader called this technical gaffe irresponsible, causing "damage to the rights, safety and security of the 350,000 persons of Mexican ancestry who reside and work, and who pay taxes in the County," and further stated that the Supervisor's action "is fomenting possible violence by bigots and racists against persons of Mexican ancestry."(51) The Supervisor subsequently corrected the misuse of the Vista/Fallbrook data and resubmitted a plan for cost recovery to the County Board of Supervisors. This episode illustrates how a call to identify fiscal costs can quickly unleash a torrent of community emotion that can just as easily be directed at the Latino community as pouring forth from it.

Because San Diego County borders Mexico and because San Diego County is the major point of entry for undocumented persons into the U.S., enforcement issues have become knotted together as "border violence." The City of San Diego has formed a joint unit with the Border Patrol to investigate border crimes (other than unlawful entry). The City's cost of the Border Crime Prevention Unit is $365,000.(52)

Although City and County enforcement procedures currently prohibit the detention of a person solely because he or she is suspected of being undocumented(53), many in the Latino community perceive that local law enforcement efforts readily become transformed into immigration practices. Proximity to the border heightens both the coordination of local and
federal enforcement agencies on border crime as well as the perception that such coordination results in selective enforcement against those who "look" Latino. Building on reports of the Coalition of Law and Justice(54), an organization concerned with the protection of individual rights that may have been abused by unfair immigration practices, a memo to the Deputy Mayor focused on the problem of selective (racial) enforcement:

Latino-looking U.S. citizens, Latino-looking legal permanent residents, and Mexican National tourists and/or entrepreneurs, as well as Latino-looking undocumented workers, have complained of the following:

a. SDPD officers ask people of Latino/Mexican descent for their "papers" and hold people they think may be undocumented for pickup by INS.

b. Not only is the police department charged with this but so are bus drivers and trolley security officers.

c. Juveniles and children caught for violating curfew are turned over to INS for deportation as opposed to being returned to their parents and parents are not notified.(55)

Upon a subsequent review of practices, both the City of San Diego Police Department and the Metropolitan Transit Development Board, which operates the trolley from San Diego to Tijuana, have reversed the identification and/or holding of possible undocumented persons for the Border Patrol.(56) The chief of the U.S. Border Patrol in San Diego, Alan Eliason, lamented the action by the Police Department as a "backing-off" from dealing with "alien" crime.(57)

The problem is one of drawing the line between separation and coordination of federal/local enforcement activities. On the one hand, local enforcement efforts must be disentangled from those which are strictly immigration practices. On the other hand, federal/local cooperation must be fostered in dealing with criminal offenses. Discussion of the grey area between separation and coordination is a topic of considerable importance to the community and enforcement agencies alike.
3) **The Health Profile of Undocumented and Legal Immigrants**

A review of the health research literature on Mexican-Americans by Nalven in a 1982 article focused on the dilemma of comparing undocumented to lawfully admitted immigrants. Because health researchers did not identify the immigration status of respondents, there was no way of knowing to what extent the samples contained more or less or any undocumented immigrants. Thus, if immigration status was a significant variable in Chicano health problems, comparisons of studies with unknown percentages of undocumented persons in their samples would, in effect, have a "wild-card" variable. (58)

In an attempt to remedy this research gap, the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies conducted a survey from 1981 to 1983 of more than 2,000 Mexican immigrants in San Diego County aged 17 and over. (59) The percentage of reported health problems reveals some interesting differences:

Documented immigrants sought care for joint ailments, cardiovascular problems, and ear, nose and throat problems more often than did undocumented interviewees. This pattern of problems can be partially attributed to a particular characteristic of the legal immigrants in our sample: they tend to be older than the undocumented respondents. On the other hand, undocumented interviewees, primarily because they are younger, sought care for obstetrics and prenatal care more than did the legal interviewees.

The report also noted that both the legal and undocumented respondents "reported accidents and injuries requiring medical care in equal proportions." (60) (See Figure 3.[61]) This finding is surprising if it indicates that undocumented workers are affected by occupational hazards to the same extent as lawfully admitted immigrants. The commonplace assumption is that undocumented workers are unable to press for the enforcement of health and safety standards to the same degree as legal residents and therefore work in more dangerous situations. (In passing, it should be noted that the research relied on a conceptually weaker
**Figure 3**

Health Problems for Which Treatment was Sought
By Immigration Status of Mexican Respondents
(in percentages)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health Category</th>
<th>Undocumented (n=1026)</th>
<th>Documented (n=971)</th>
<th>Total (n=1997)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gastro-intestinal</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>10.7%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neurological</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children's disease</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joints</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ear, Nose, Throat</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eyes</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chest-pulmonary (respiratory)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chest-cardiovascular</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Symptomatic</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kidney-urological</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gynecology</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstetrics-prenatal</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skin</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accidents-injuries</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancer</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endocrine</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional disturbance</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>28.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Response</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0

"snow-ball" sampling design compared to a random sampling methodology. The choice of sampling design was dictated by the need to obtain immigration status through a method which did not raise the fear of deportation.\(^{(62)}\)

Public health concerns are also raised about the diseases brought to the United States. Malaria, for example, is often brought to the United States by travellers from abroad. In 1980, 52 civilian cases were reported in San Diego County, largely from Indochinese refugees. In 1986, through August, 29 cases were reported, primarily diagnosed in migrant farmworkers of Hispanic origin. Although the Department of Public Health does not investigate immigration status, the circumstances strongly suggest that the persons affected were undocumented farmworkers some of whom picked up the disease as they travelled north through Oaxaca and Cuernavaca. The concern expressed by public health officials was not the number of such cases, which are not much different from previous years, but because the cases occurred in a focused area near Carlsbad, California. Eighteen of the twenty cases were Mexican nationals and two were county residents. This is the first time that there have been documented cases that have been transmitted within the county, and most of these cases were thought to be acquired locally. Because of the presence of mosquitos that carry malaria, the episode could be repeated.\(^{(63)}\) Public health officials responded by providing malarial drugs to those most at risk (the farmworkers in the affected area), providing additional voluntary testing, and spraying to eradicate mosquitos.\(^{(64)}\)

4) **The Fiscal Impact of Undocumented Immigrants on Schools and Hospitals**

Determination of fiscal impacts attributable to undocumented persons is no less difficult than developing undocumented population counts. Several key issues revolve around whether agencies attempt to identify undocumented
persons and, if so, how they go about screening them. Upon close
inspection, administrative "screening" procedures appear to suffer from the
practice of racial identification.

A study of health utilization of Mexican immigrants by the Center for
U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego, concluded
that health care facilities eventually "learned of their patients' illegal
immigration status."(65) Personnel reported that:

○ We are particularly suspicious of a young person that doesn't speak
  English--only Spanish.

○ The way they walk, the way they talk.

○ If a patient looks Caucasian, there is no problem. But if a Spanish-
  looking person produces no ID, they're asked for a green card or a
driver's license.(66)

Hospitals are, of course, trying to identify a source of payment. If
Medical coverage cannot be obtained for an indigent person, and if there is
no other third-party insurer, then either the hospital, the County, or the
patient must pay the costs. Because undocumented persons do not wish to be
screened out and referred to INS for lawful immigration status verification
(the referral process is used by the County of San Diego), they have a high
rate of payment for medical costs, especially for out-service
treatment.(67) A study of health care of Mexican immigrants found that
undocumented immigrants reported that they pay over 80 percent (long-term
settlers) to 90 percent (recent migrants) of their medical bills, while
legal migrants paid half or less by themselves. (See Figure 4.[68])

Because hospitals and clinics do not attempt to break out costs and
revenues for undocumented patients, except in the case of University
Hospital where the County has sought to establish a basis for federal
reimbursement, it is extremely difficult to quantify fiscal impacts based on
a survey of health care facilities. One recent study simply reported
Figure 4
Sources of Payment for Medical Care

**DOCUMENTED**
Sample Size 801

- Medical Insurance: 34.8% (N=279)
- Government Sponsored Program: 24.1% (N=193)
- Respondent's Own: 39.8% (N=319)
- Other: 1.2% (N=10)

**UNDOCUMENTED**
Sample Size 816

- Government Sponsored Program: 3.2% (N=26)
- Medical Insurance: 10.3% (N=84)
- Respondent's Own: 84.4% (N=689)
- Other: 2.1% (N=17)

Significance (Chi-square) = .001 or less.

perceived impacts from "large" (four hospitals), "small" (10), to "none" (3), while identifying the impact at one hospital as "$200,000." (69) (See Figure 5.) Each of the County-based studies focused on the reported amounts from University Hospital. However, only the 1980 study reporting on calendar year 1979 attempted to discern costs for actual undocumented patients at the hospital. The amount was $652,000. From this amount, the report projected County-wide hospital costs from $2.2 to $4.1 million dollars, based on the judgement that University Hospital receives about 20 percent of the undocumented patients within the County. (70) When viewed in terms of dollar amounts, these sums are substantial; however, when viewed in terms of total patient costs, the percentage ranges from 3.3 percent to 6.4 percent of total patient costs for University Hospital and from 1 percent to 2 percent of projected patient costs for all hospitals in San Diego.

An important element that was explicitly not explored in the County-based studies was the impact on health care clinics. Part of this can be attributed to a perceived ethical dilemma: The clinics were more open to serving undocumented persons, asking only for residency status. If clinics were given high visibility, they may have been singled out for funding reductions. (71) The immigrant health study by Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies brought out for public discussion the substantial use of clinics by undocumented immigrants without a feared fiscal backlash. (72) As measured by the 1980 County study, the actual fiscal impact of undocumented persons on the health care system is relatively small. With legalization of status, this population would probably make greater use of hospital facilities, rising to the utilization levels of legal migrants and the overall population. (73) Public attitudes are based on broad impressions, emphasizing the perceived impact that undocumented immigrants
**Figure 5**
Comparison of Health and Education Fiscal Impacts of "Aliens": San Diego County
(in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health</th>
<th>County-Sponsored Studies</th>
<th>Cornelius, et al.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 74-75</td>
<td>FY 75-76</td>
<td>FY 78-79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. University Hospital</td>
<td>.5*</td>
<td>1.0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. A SouthBay Hospital</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Hospitals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. All Hospitals</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Designated Clinics</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(C-3,25,27,28, 29,30)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. All Clinics</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Education               |                          |                   |                  |                  |
| 1. County Schools       | .2 (NI/NC)               | .1 (NC)           | X                |                  |
| 2. All Schools          | X                        | X                 | 10.9-21          |                  |

* Includes individuals who are Mexican nationals, but not necessarily undocumented aliens.
have on government-supported social services. In a survey of San Diego residents, Loveman and Hofstetter found that significant minorities of respondents believe that illegal immigrants decreased the availability of housing (34 per cent) (even though 82 per cent believe there was no effect in their neighborhoods), decreased the availability of welfare benefits for citizens (35 per cent), negatively affected the quality of health care available (29 per cent), and negatively affected the quality of public education (34 per cent), parks (29 per cent), and transportation (18 per cent) in San Diego.(74)

Public perceptions can underwrite specific local level policies, as in the case of the County's lawsuit against the federal government to obtain reimbursement of medical costs. However, in other areas, such as education, significant policy change must be achieved through state legislation. In California, all children must enroll in school; however, prior to 1979, State law required the names of nonimmigrant and noncitizen (NI/NC) children to be reported for reimbursement. As a result of this requirement, the 1975 County study judged that the number of reported NI/NC children was low:

Although [the table] reflects the total number of NI/NC children claimed for reimbursement in San Diego County, the data is misleading for it does not indicate the exact number of estimated NI/NC children believed to exist in the school districts of San Diego County. This situation is caused by districts who do not feel it is necessary to file a claim for reimbursement since all NI/NC children are automatically included in the total district enrollment for state apportionment monies. Additionally, many districts are reluctant to file claims for reimbursement because of the problems that might arise with the INS as a result of having to provide names and addresses of NI/NC children to the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.(75)

Thus, in the educational arena, the estimated numbers are too small for 1975 (and 1977 as well) because of the general underreporting of the number of "NI/NC" children, while, as we noted earlier, County hospital administrators sought to include as many "alien" chargeable costs as possible. For educators, reimbursement was considered to be automatic from the State; for County and University Hospital administrators, the case for reimbursement from the federal government had yet to be concluded. The
difference in obtaining fiscal reimbursement by the health and educational agencies helps explain the variation in their interest in reporting undocumented individuals to INS.

The 1980 County study simulated a sizeable, undocumented school age population of approximately six to eleven thousand children. (The total K-12 student population in the County was 309,973.) The study judged that it is unlikely that all of the students would be enrolled in school, given residual "fears" of detection, a high drop-out rate for Latino high school students, and estimation procedures which may have biased the population structure towards a younger population. Although the estimate may be high, the projection represents the first attempt to assess a county-wide school district impact.

In June 1986, the County Board of Supervisors reiterated its interest in determining the fiscal impact of undocumented immigrants on County services. The Board directed the Chief Administrative Officer to develop a program that could determine the fiscal impact in a "non-discriminatory manner."(75) The "non-discriminatory" language was used in the 1980 County study which focused on the referral process used at the County's University Hospital:

It is not known how many [undocumented persons] have been reported by (Hospital Intake Service) or deported as a result of these referrals. These types of screening mechanisms can result in public health hazards and civil rights violations. This procedure should be subject of a future study to see if it is cost-effective as well as non-discriminatory.(77)

The discriminatory effect can be understood as a doubling-up of eligibility requirements: those focusing on income needs with those focusing on immigration status. The result can lead to discrimination against citizens and permanent residents who have the same physical and/or cultural characteristics as the prototypical undocumented immigrant,
namely, the Latino. One doctor at a San Diego hospital refused admission to a Mexican-American youth who had accidentally shot himself. The doctor stated that the hospital did not want "Mexican aliens laying around the ward, eating up our funds."(78) Avoidance of this form of discrimination would require that every individual entering the hospital requiring government assistance be subject to the same procedure, not merely those persons who "look" undocumented.

Because the County's INS referral procedure is, in essence, intended to "discriminate" legal from undocumented persons, it is unlikely that any new information will be generated unless the County Supervisors decide to have everyone requiring assistance submit to an INS check or if the Supervisors choose an alternative survey approach conducted by outside researchers.

5) Welfare Impacts

"Welfare" comprises a range of assistance: general relief; aid to families with dependent children (AFDC); food stamps; children's services; and homemaker services. The measured impact of undocumented persons on welfare services in San Diego County has been negligible, largely due to an administrative screening mechanism to determine lawful immigration status.

The history of this screening mechanism illustrates its effectiveness. The first County study (1975) stated that 9,132 WR-6 forms were sent from the Department of Welfare to INS to determine eligibility benefits for those persons suspected of being illegal aliens. Only 10 persons were found to be illegal aliens, representing a cost of $13,608 in grants.(79) The County Director of Welfare requested that the WR-6 referral process be dropped as cost-ineffective, especially since staff time to process the referrals cost $9,497, nearly as much as the grants themselves.(80)
A year later, INS incorporated a "personal interview" into the WR-6 referral procedure. According to the 1977 County study, a six-month review of 1,173 WR-6 referrals (excluding 231 that were still in process) showed that 38.1% of those referred were verified as legally present, 19.1% failed to appear or respond to the INS letter (and were discontinued from assistance), and 42.8% were verified as not legally present (and were also discontinued from assistance).(81)

Several observations are in order. First, the conclusion of the 1975 County study that the WR-6 referral was cost-ineffective was only true to the extent that the INS review was cursory. When the INS instituted a more careful review, the WR-6 referral process turned out to be extremely effective. Second, the 1977 study makes a distinction between cost impact and cost savings. The cost impact to the county is reflected by the assistance actually provided to those individuals who were found ineligible after the INS review, $180,832 (from May to December 1976). However, the cost savings to the County is reflected by the potential assistance that the County would have had to pay had these individuals' unlawful status not been uncovered by INS--some $90,416 per month.(82)

The 1980 County study reported that the CA-6 (previously WR-6) referral process verified 170 undocumented persons in 1977, 99 in 1978, and 74 persons in 1979 through December.(83) With respect to the general relief and food stamp programs, the Department of Public Welfare asserted that there was no fiscal impact since both programs required proof of citizenship or legal residency before benefits were issued.(84)

The process of identifying costs is undermined by the categories used to measure how undocumented persons participate in the system of services available in the U.S. For example, children who were born in the United States, and hence eligible for AFDC and food stamps, may be embedded in
families who are largely undocumented. Thus, it would not be inconsistent for the Department of Public Welfare to state that there is little or no assistance going to undocumented persons while, at the same time, providing considerable assistance to undocumented families (but targeted only to the legal members within those families). The Department of Public Welfare was unable to respond to this issue in the 1980 County study. (85)

A final issue centers around the rate of welfare utilization should undocumented persons be legalized. The 1980 County study argued that the rate would be at least the same as the general population. Community Research Associates studied the rate of using welfare among holders of Silva-Bell letters. (These individuals were present in the U.S. illegally, but were potential recipients of visa numbers that the Department of State and INS had given to Cuban refugees against the quotas for Western Hemisphere countries. During the period of this class action suit, some 1,800 individuals were on file in the San Diego INS office with letters from INS allowing them to remain legally in the U.S. until their case was resolved.) These individuals can be taken as an analog to those undocumented persons who have a stake and interest in becoming legalized. There were 84 holders of Silva-Bell letters in San Diego who had active AFDC cases, representing 4.66% of the Silva-Bell population in San Diego County. This rate is similar to that of the general population receiving AFDC, 4.8%, or 86,431 persons receiving AFDC in a county with 1.8 million residents. (86)

6) Housing Impacts

The 1980 County study, based on the premise of removing the undocumented population from San Diego, projected a substantial short-term impact in housing construction. Two years after this population left San
Diego, some 8,000 to 17,000 housing units would be vacated, thereby reducing overall consumer demand for housing. Ten years after this population left San Diego, the housing market would no longer experience any effect due to the removal of this population. This short- and long-term impact is premised on the assumption that "the housing demand of the undocumented population is comparable to that of the overall population. If in fact the undocumented population has a lower demand for housing, the construction impacts in this analysis may be somewhat overstated."(87) Although not mentioned in the report, rents would be under pressure to decline.

Federal legislation and regulations can directly and indirectly effect the housing situation in San Diego. For example, federal regulations, taking effect on July 30, 1986, are intended to restrict housing assistance to those citizens and others who are "lawfully present in the United States."(88) However, the director of San Diego's Housing Commission estimated that few of the 6,000 assisted housing units were occupied by undocumented aliens.(89)

To the extent that undocumented immigrants receive lawful immigration status under new legislation and are currently occupying units within the San Diego housing market, little impact would be felt since they would not be forced to leave their present housing (whether in assisted or in non-assisted units). However, the creation of a guestworker program as part of immigration reform could well have a minor impact in communities adjacent to farming areas. Many of San Diego's undocumented farm workers live in North San Diego County and a substantial number of these individuals live in plastic-roofed shacks and "spider holes" (small caves). Legalized farm labor would no longer be expected to live in these substandard conditions. Under H.R. 3810 farmers would be expected to set
up temporary labor camps or "secure housing that meets the local standards for rental or public accomodation (or both) or other substantially similar class of habitation."(90) It is uncertain whether the County Board of Supervisors would permit farmers to set up temporary labor camps. If the Supervisors do not make this allowance for farmers, these farm workers may find themselves entering the North County housing market and competing for low-income housing in an area where housing costs are high.

7) Tax Contributions and Per Capita Subventions

To the extent that undocumented workers are taxed at the source of their employment and have no discretion in determining the amount of taxes withheld, it is likely that these workers are paying a fair share of state and federal taxes. Also, to the extent that federal and state subventions are made on a per capita basis, any census which formally includes undocumented persons will trigger additional government payments to cities and counties.

Each of the San Diego County sponsored studies estimated tax contributions made by undocumented persons. Variation between these studies was due partly to the difference in the total number of undocumented persons each study estimated for San Diego County. However, there were inconsistencies in the types of contributions identified (see Figure 6). The 1975 study identified property tax contributions, while the 1977 and 1980 studies did not. The 1980 study, with the aid of a demographic and economic forecasting model, was able to project sales tax revenues. None of the studies attempted to calculate telephone taxes that undocumented persons pay. A more thorough analysis is needed to develop a comprehensive picture of the total tax contributions made by undocumented persons.
Figure 6

Estimated Tax Contributions
(In millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1975 County Study</th>
<th>1977 County Study</th>
<th>1980 County Study</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Estimated Number of</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>47,764*</td>
<td>9,042-17,652**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undocumented Taxpayers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment Insurance</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>2.2 - 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker's Compensation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>3.5 - 7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Security (FICA)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>7.8 - 15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Disability Insurance</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>0.6 - 1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal Income Tax</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>0***</td>
<td>1.4 - 2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Income Tax</td>
<td>.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Tax</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>.6 - 3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone Tax</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property Tax</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Assumption that 20 percent of undocumented workers paid no taxes out of a total of 59,705 undocumented workers.

** Assumption that no agricultural or domestic (housekeeper) workers paid federal or state income taxes. For worker's compensation and other taxes which do not depend on worker's cooperation in determining the amount of tax to be withheld (such as claiming the number of dependents), survey results indicated that 17 percent of undocumented workers received income from jobs that were outside the formal economy and, as a result, were not taxed at the source of employment.

*** Earnings are too low to require payment of income tax.
The only taxes that would be of immediate benefit to local government would be the property tax and the local share of the sales tax returned by the state government. The majority of the taxes flow to state and federal government. However, the flow of taxes to the state and federal government is balanced in part by government subventions based on per capita formulas. In California, there are three major subventions that are sensitive to population growth, including the motor vehicle in-lieu tax, the state highway users tax, and the cigarette tax apportionment (see Figure 7).

Since the early 1980s, the State Department of Finance has been incorporating undocumented persons in its estimates of population growth for California and its counties. This new factor affects the overall state budgeting process, which can be increased in proportion to population growth and inflation. It also affects those subventions which are partly based on population growth. For FY 85-86, San Diego County obtained approximately 1.7 million dollars and the cities of San Diego County received another 2.3 million dollars because of the identification of undocumented persons in the region's population.

The population figure for undocumented persons used in Figure 6 is 72,000, which is based on the Bureau of the Census estimate of 50,000 undocumented persons in San Diego County plus the State Department of Finance's 4,400 calculation of an annual increment of undocumented persons between the ages of 18 and 64. While here it is argued that there are another 10,000 undocumented persons under 18 and over 64 (see discussion on Figure 2 above) for FY 85-86, this additional number was not included in Figure 6. Since the State Department of Finance does not directly identify the under 18 and over 64 undocumented population in its figures, this missing population segment would not be included in any subventions given to local governments. The subvention estimates shown in Figure 6 are based
Figure 7

Major State Subventions to San Diego County and Cities:
Per Capita Reimbursement for the Total Resident Population
and the Undocumented Population (91)
FY 85-86
(in millions of dollars)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Cities</th>
<th>County</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>For Total</td>
<td>For Undoc.</td>
<td>For Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resident</td>
<td>Pop.</td>
<td>Resident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle In-Lieu (81.25% Portion)</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Amount</td>
<td>City:</td>
<td>County:</td>
<td>City:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$27.53</td>
<td>$21.23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle In-Lieu (18.75 Portion)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Amount</td>
<td>County:</td>
<td></td>
<td>City:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$3.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Highway Users Tax Gas Tax (2107)</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>.5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Amount</td>
<td>City:</td>
<td>County:</td>
<td>City:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$8.71</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cigarette Tax</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>.2</td>
<td>.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Amount</td>
<td>City:</td>
<td>County:</td>
<td>City:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$3.10</td>
<td>$.24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total County Population: 2,166,169
Total All Cities Within San Diego County: 1,780,572
Undocumented Population: 72,000*

* Allocated between All Cities and County in the same ratio as total population. 82 percent (59,000) in all San Diego cities.
on data supplied by the Department of Finance and the Controller's Office.

8) The Impact of Undocumented Labor: A Systems Approach

Few would deny the importance of Mexican labor in the development of the U.S. Southwest. However, with the maturing of the U.S. economy, and the legalization and acculturation of many Mexican nationals within the U.S., the issue is once again being re-assessed: What is the current role for Mexican labor in the U.S. economy? Manufacturers view positively the maquiladora, or in-bond, industry located just across the border as a factor enabling U.S. firms to remain competitive in the international marketplace. Farmers in San Diego County argue that it is extremely difficult to farm without undocumented Mexican labor or, should new legislation be passed, without an H-2 equivalent to undocumented farm workers. Farm labor organizations point to the displacement of Mexican-American workers by undocumented Mexican workers because of hiring preferences by farmers.

Beyond these fairly understandable U.S.-Mexican labor market connections, the relationship becomes less clear and more difficult to isolate and measure with precision. The difficulty of measuring the current and future role of "Mexican" labor in this region has much to do with the mixing of legal and undocumented flow of labor across the border. For example, the hotel/restaurant labor segment, encompassing both service and retail establishments, makes use of legal and undocumented Mexican-origin labor—with a predictable differential in wage levels. The labor market niches, such as dishwasher, food prep, and cook become noticeably embedded through social network recruitment. In sum, there are important symbiotic labor market relationships that unite both sides of the U.S.-Mexican border.
From a binational labor market perspective, it may be inappropriate to sever the flow of undocumented migration from the border relationship. After all, with a forecasted decline in the U.S. labor supply, Mexican labor may be a benefit to some employers with a shrinking pool of low cost labor as well as an indirect benefit to consumers that buy products or use services that rely on this type of labor. A pro-U.S. labor perspective, combined with that of others who are concerned with the integrity of the legal immigration system, would favor curtailing undocumented migration from Mexico. The degree of job displacement is central to the policy debate: Do undocumented workers "replace" U.S. workers in jobs they do not want; do they "take" U.S. jobs by undercutting wage levels and working conditions; or do they "take" U.S. jobs by accepting relatively well paid jobs that U.S. workers would accept?

The three County-sponsored studies each addressed this issue. The first two studies (1975, 1977) focused on INS enforcement operations. In 1975, INS apprehended 2,154 undocumented workers. The State Human Resources Agency attempted to fill these jobs with domestic workers, but failed to do so.(92) In 1977, INS launched "Employer Cooperation Program," leading to the termination of 340 jobs held by undocumented workers. Ninety per cent of these jobs were taken by commuter workers from Baja California.(93) No effort was made in these two studies to go beyond these INS operations. Such operations have occurred sporadically since then, most notably "Operation Jobs" in April and May of 1982. An evaluation of this enforcement approach to job creation is being conducted by the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego, comparing San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.(94) This study is discussed below on pages 54-57.
A far different approach than the above mentioned studies was taken by the County's 1980 study (Community Research Associates and Criterion), a complementary follow-up study (Community Research Associates, 1981), and further simulation efforts (Nalven and Flolid, 1983). These approaches directly employed, or critically reacted to, the use of a demographic and economic forecasting model developed for San Diego County by the Comprehensive Planning Organization (now SANDAG), Econometrics Associates (now Criterion), County of San Diego, City of San Diego, and San Diego Gas & Electric.

The strength of this particular forecasting model is in its ability to mimic the local economy, permitting policy analysts to simulate the effects of major impacts or "shocks" to the region. The model uses over 500 demographic and economic variables, with about 150 predetermined "shift" variables. Inasmuch as the model is based on past trends, unanticipated changes lead to a more rapid decay of its forecasting capability.

The 1980 County study considered the following "what if" scenario: What if all the undocumented workers were removed from the local economy? How would this removal affect the unemployment rate, employment, and employment migration? Two sets of data were critical: a legal-labor-supply assumptions matrix and a labor-substitution-demand-for-undocumented-labor assumptions matrix. The former was developed by interviewing unemployed domestic labor at local Employment Development Department offices and asking these individuals whether they would be willing to take various jobs and at what wage level (see Figure 8). The jobs represented bottom rung and middle rung jobs in the five major industrial classifications in which undocumented workers were employed. The latter assumptions matrix was based on the number of undocumented workers estimated to be in these five industries and at what wage level they worked.
### Figure 8

**Labor Substitution**
**Demand For Undocumented Labor**
**Assumptions Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Sector</th>
<th>Vacated Positions</th>
<th>Wage Structure (% Total Jobs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>2,880</td>
<td>1,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>1,850</td>
<td>790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>7,260</td>
<td>4,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>8,090</td>
<td>4,120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2,510</td>
<td>1,440</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 9

**Legal Supply of Labor**
**Assumptions Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Sector</th>
<th>Available Labor Force</th>
<th>Availability Distribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&gt;$3.5</td>
<td>&lt;$3.5*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>3,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>7,100</td>
<td>5,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td>9,500</td>
<td>7,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fewer people receiving welfare

(see Figure 9).

From these two matrices, one can estimate the degree of labor substitutability. In construction, where wages are higher, substitutability is higher; in agriculture, where wages are low, substitutability is lower. For agriculture, the forecasted results were catastrophic: only 38 to 50 percent of the jobs would be filled by legal residents. (96) While the point is fairly straightforward, the exact formatting of that relationship by wage level, by number of jobs vacated, and by number of domestic workers available at these respective wage levels is a difficult proposition. Moreover, it is subject to several important criticisms. Hypothetical responses at unemployment offices are not equivalent to taking a job at a stated wage level. Also, employers may be paying a lower wage because the current worker is undocumented, and if a legal worker were to be hired, the employer would not be able to take advantage of an illegal status and thereby would not actually offer the job to a domestic worker.

The major question for researchers and policy makers is whether such simulations have real value. True, the process is fraught with judgments about labor force size, distributions, wage levels, and worker willingness to take targeted jobs. However, these factors are the building blocks for policy judgments about the "need" for temporary, foreign workers. Employer claims of labor "needs" should be tested. While such a test may not be possible with a purists' data set, one can choose to explore the dynamics of the situation with an operationalists' simulation. The methodological puzzle admits of no simple answer. It must, though, be addressed if we are to decipher what the labor market impacts of undocumented workers are and what would happen if we tampered with the current labor market relationship, especially as we experience it in a border regional context.
Two extensions of this first study were conducted. One approach reversed the original premise. Instead of considering what would happen if undocumented workers were removed from the local economy, the question became what would happen if there were continued undocumented immigrant flows? What would be the percentage impacts on the unemployment rate, on per capita income, on income-transfer payments, and so on? Further, what would happen if the migration flow were set at 1,000 per annum and at 10,000 per annum? Again, the assumptions were critical. The researchers streamed the migration flow into the same industries in which undocumented workers are currently employed and at their current wage levels. Such wage levels are clearly lower than what migrants from other parts of the U.S. would be expected to have. In both cases, the impacts were relatively low. The most significant long term impact was on the unemployment rate after experiencing ten to fifteen years of an additional annual flow of 10,000 workers. (See Appendix 4 for a list of the impact results.)(97)

The second extension resulted in a study of employers of undocumented workers: Agriculture was selected as the industrial segment that most heavily relied on undocumented workers; restaurants were selected as a moderately affected industrial segment; and electronics manufacturing was selected as a negative case--an industrial segment that did not rely much on undocumented labor. What motivated this study was, in part, a reaction against a naive acceptance of a "prevailing wage" framework. There had been no investigation of industry flexibility in the face of policy requirements to shift to a domestic, and hence, a more expensive labor force. Moreover, the employer's hiring decision had been treated solely as an economic one, where in fact, the employer may prefer certain types of workers, stemming from personal and cultural attitudes.
Even more troublesome for the anthropologist member of the project was the absence of ethnicity as a variable. It might be argued that ethnic groups concentrate in certain types of jobs, due to culturally and socially accepted career trajectories. Thus, if Blacks and Anglos were not to be found in San Diego agriculture, they would find their niche in another area of the economy: different queues for different groups, but with the same aggregate economic effect. Perhaps. Affirmative action programs and government sponsored job training programs challenge a too easy acceptance of ethnically segregated job niches or "queues" among a range of employment structures.

There were two major findings: one concerning industry flexibility, the other employer preferences towards domestic and undocumented workers. The summary here will focus on agriculture since it is this segment of the economy that called for a special exception, namely, the H-2 temporary worker program.

The employers' appraisal of undocumented versus citizen and legal resident workers varied from industry to industry, following their proportional use of undocumented workers. The responses of farmers were diametrically opposed to those of electronics manufacturers (with restaurateur responses falling in between). Farmers agreed, while electronics manufacturers disagreed, that undocumented workers represent lower labor costs; farmers questioned whether U.S. workers could be substituted into the jobs held by undocumented workers, while electronics manufacturers felt that U.S. workers were completely substitutable for undocumented workers; and farmers strongly disagreed with the idea of employer sanctions, while electronics manufacturers largely favored the idea. (98)
Agriculture appeared to be the least flexible industry in comparing the farmers' perceived ability to raise wage levels with the wage level desired by unemployed domestic labor. However, during the course of the research, the competition between North and South County farmers surfaced, indicating that the issue was more complex than farmer versus farm worker. South County farmers paid higher wages than North County farmers, both on union and non-union farms. Apparently the county's terrain favored North County farmers in making it more difficult for the Border Patrol to apprehend undocumented workers than in South County. As a result, South County farmers had to turn to farm workers who were lawfully present in the United States—and lawful presence meant higher wages.

The study concluded that any claimed "need" for temporary, foreign workers—at least as viewed in this border county—should be tested against several propositions, three of which derived directly from the differences in North and South County use of undocumented farm labor:

- That farmers pay a wage which does not depress the wages of legally available workers.
- That farmers hire available domestic workers from this region (including farm workers from San Diego and Imperial counties as well as "green-card," commuter workers from Tijuana and Mexicali).
- That farmers have not been and are not firing legal workers in order to hire illegal workers to justify their "need" for guest workers.

The change in methodology (from an emphasis on number crunching and simulation to an emphasis on ethnographic description) and subject (from undocumented workers to employers) led to a wider understanding of labor-force "needs." This research shift was paralleled by a policy shift in the recommendation of the County's Border Task Force, as well as that of the Supervisors themselves, concerning the "need" for a temporary, foreign-worker program. After the completion of the 1980 study, which, as mentioned above, forecasted potential catastrophic impacts on agriculture
should farmers not be given access to undocumented workers or their H-2 equivalents, the Board of Supervisors voted in favor of a guest-worker program and invited the federal government to initiate a pilot program in San Diego. (101)

With the impetus for national immigration legislation underway, the Board of Supervisors reconvened the Border Task Force (with a slightly different membership). Based partly on their review of the second study conducted by Community Research Associates and an in-depth discussion with Jorge Bustamante, from El Colegio de la Frontera Norte (COLEF), the Border Task Force took strong exception to the Administration's legislative proposals:

The Border Task Force recommends opposition to the Administration's proposed provisions relating to a Temporary (Guest) Worker Program as detailed in Title VI The Temporary Mexican Workers Act. The Border Task Force further recommends opposition to any form of temporary (guest) worker program. (102)

The Board of Supervisors adopted the recommendation of the Border Task Force, but with an amendment: "Some legal, rational, but non-bureaucratic framework is needed with which migration could occur with dignity to the individual workers." (103)

Since the Community Research Associates' studies in 1980 and 1981, two additional labor market studies have been conducted. Morales focused on full-service restaurants, while a team of researchers at the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of California, San Diego have investigated the use of immigrant labor in a variety of industries in San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco.

Morales' research confirms the restauranteurs' ethnic preferences noted by Community Research Associates: "Employers prefer immigrants for (dishwasher, food prep, and cook) jobs because they perceive them to be more dependable, to have lower turnover rates, and to be content to stay at
menial [tasks such as these] for longer periods without expecting advancement to premium [jobs]."(104)

The Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies began a project in 1982 called "Government Attempts to Regulate the Use of Mexican Labor in the California Economy: An Exploratory Study" (subsequently retitled as "The Role of Mexican Labor in the California Economy").(105) Preliminary results have been released in individual papers, offering a preview of the findings and their limitations.

The study sample included 177 firms, spanning seven industries, in the San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco areas. The profile of the firms sampled reveal that the smallest firms were in San Diego (average number of employees, 62) and the largest firms were in Los Angeles (average number of employees, 241), with San Francisco falling in the middle (average number of employees, 110). Other major differences among the firms sampled by area include degree of unionization, with San Diego the least unionized (29 percent) and San Francisco the most unionized (57 percent) and experience with previous INS raid, with firms in San Diego, San Francisco, and Los Angeles being raided 39 percent, 49 percent, and 69 percent respectively (see Figure 10).

What is interesting to note is that the attitude of employers towards an anticipated difficulty in continuing operation with the passage of restrictive immigration reform appears to be correlated with the past experience of being raided by INS as well as with the average size of firm.
Figure 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>San Diego</th>
<th>San Francisco</th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Av. Size of Firm</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously Raided</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipated Difficulty With Restrictive Legislation</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Cornelius argues that INS enforcement practices would focus on larger firms because they have a larger concentration of immigrant laborers, making the work of INS more cost-effective. However, larger firms would react by subcontracting to smaller firms that are generally ignored by INS. These firms are also less likely to be unionized and receive less attention from occupation health and safety regulatory agencies.

The net result of this kind of government intervention would be a redistribution of immigrant job opportunities.... This amounts to herding the undocumented even more into those parts of the labor market where their labor rights are most likely to be violated, while exerting even stronger downward pressure on wage scales in these sectors, and further impeding the unionization of the undocumented work force. In sum, this is a prescription for further degradation of labor standards in the United States.(106)

The consequences that Cornelius predicts will be of interest to the policy and research communities alike. However, as further results of the study are released, it will be critical to examine whether the preliminary assessment is confirmed by further analysis of the 177 surveyed firms, particularly by comparisons within each of the seven industries, by area (San Diego, Los Angeles, and San Francisco), raided versus non-raided firms, unionized versus non-unionized firms, as well as by size of firm. On the basis of the analysis presented thus far, it would be premature to single
### Figure 11
Comparison of Small Firms and Large Firms on Selected Variables (Complete Sample)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Small Firms (N=89)</th>
<th>Large Firms (N=88)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Median Number of Employees:</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unionized:</strong></td>
<td>27.3%</td>
<td>54.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>% Monolingual Spanish Speakers in total work force (median among firms):</strong></td>
<td>50.0%</td>
<td>50.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Entry-level hourly wage (median):</strong></td>
<td>$3.75</td>
<td>$4.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average profitability of firm:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very profitable:</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>46.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat profitable:</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breaks even or operates at a loss:</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other:</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ask about U.S. Citizenship or legal-resident status during hiring process?—No:</strong></td>
<td>62.9%</td>
<td>34.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attempt to verify job applicant's immigration status, by demanding documents or check with INS: No attempt made or just accept applicant's assurance of legal resident status:</strong></td>
<td>48.8%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Changed hiring practices (e.g. by requiring proof of legal resident status) as a result of most recent INS raid?—Yes:</strong></td>
<td>29.4%</td>
<td>45.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>How would permanent reduction in supply of undocumented immigrant labor affect firm?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm would not survive (go out of bus.):</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No basic change in operations—substitute workers would be hired:</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>36.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages and employee benefits would have to be raised, reducing profits:</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wages and benefits would have to be raised, but costs passed on to consumers:</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm would move abroad:</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm would mechanize production:</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other response:</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't know:</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>By how much could firm raise wages and still be profitable?</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None (no increase possible):</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>44.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 25% increase possible:</td>
<td>39.7%</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-50% raise possible:</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 50% increase possible:</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>100.3%</td>
<td>100.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


56
out "size of firm" as being the most significant of the variables used in the survey (as reflected in the organization of the data by size of firm in Figure 11).

What is curious, if not perplexing, in Cornelius' review of the literature(107), is that he omits reference to major research projects on firms and employer views about immigrant workers in Los Angeles and San Diego. In the Los Angeles area, Cornelius omits the important work of Sheldon Maram on the garment and restaurant industries.(108) In San Diego, Cornelius ignores the Community Research Associates study of employers. It is unclear whether the results of Cornelius' work will be adequately tested against the already existing research on California labor markets.

Discussion

The Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy concluded that undocumented or "back-door" immigration was not in the national interest of the United States. This sentiment has been echoed through successive immigration proposals that have been put forth in Congress, beginning with H.R. 6514 and H.R. 5872 in the 97th Congress (1982), to H.R. 1510 in the 98th Congress (1983), to H.R. 3080 and H.R. 3810 in the 99th Congress (1985).(109) Discussion has often centered on whether there is a need to close the back door to immigration and how to do so fairly, not whether the nation has a right to do so.

This paper has focused on "impacts," the conceptual counterpart to "needs." The close relationship between "impacts" and "needs" can be seen in the discussion of labor market and fiscal impacts of undocumented immigration. For example, some argue that the U.S. will experience a labor shortfall in the 1990s for menial jobs. In this scenario, surplus undocumented labor from Mexico represents a positive impact by meeting this
labor force need in the U.S. economy. From this perspective, there is no need to close the door to undocumented immigration.

An underlying premise of this perspective is that jobs will be structured in the 1990s as they are now. However, the structure and existence of jobs do change: The hand picking of pole tomatoes can be transformed into the mechanized picking of bush tomatoes; restaurant diners can eat on paper plates instead of on plates that require dishwashers; hotel patrons can even make their own beds instead of having maids do so. Menial jobs are not always a necessity. They can often be mechanized or eliminated. In those cases, the question is really one of "preferences," rather than "needs." And, even if the need is proven, there is choice in how to respond (such as restructuring the workplace, greater incentives to use the unemployed and underemployed, and importing cheap labor, but through lawfully established mechanisms).

The examination of "needs" and "impacts" also extends into the issue of fiscal costs for government services. Here, some would argue that undocumented immigrants are a net benefit to the system, claiming that they pay taxes without making great use of government programs. Others argue against this "windfall myth," counterclaiming that undocumented immigrants pay little in taxes and make considerable use of government services. Further, the presence of undocumented immigrants may indirectly increase the use of government subsidy programs by taking jobs from citizens and legal residents, either directly or indirectly. (110)

The resolution of this issue can influence the outcome of immigration policy. If it can be conclusively proven that undocumented immigrants represent major negative impacts on government subsidy programs and on the domestic labor market, policy makers would be far more inclined to pass immigration reform. In the absence of definitive proof, matched by
complaints from some employers about their inability to attract American workers for hard work at low pay and by advocates of the undocumented immigrants' "right" to remain based on equity factors, policy makers have been unable to forge a majority to pass immigration reform (through August 1986).

This paper has attempted to make more tangible the set of issues surrounding the impacts of undocumented workers by reducing the scope of discussion from the national level to a regional one. What has emerged is a regional picture just as complex. However, at this level of analysis, several factors come into focus as essential preliminaries to any thorough impact assessment:

- **Determination of immigration status.** The validity and reliability of statements made about undocumented immigrants depends on an accurate identification of the study population. Studies on San Diego County have moved from using INS estimates of undocumented workers to a combination of methods, using Delphi estimations, "snowball" samples, strategically selected samples (such as the Silva-Bell applicants), as well as the 1980 national census. These studies took care to aggressively evaluate the limitations of their respective methodology.

  Local officials are now attempting to standardize the taking of direct measures through "non-discriminatory" identification procedures. However, the easiest method for employees in the field is to pick out only those who "look" undocumented, rather than check all clients through an INS data bank. Government agencies must meet the standards of constitutional consistency by checking everyone and avoid the pretense of being able to perform INS functions (unless cross-trained by INS and allowed to use its databank). Thus, a cautionary note must be re-stated about the value of any data that are presented without a detailed discussion of the limits of the method used.
to generate them. The urgency to develop system-wide data on the impacts of undocumented persons can easily fall prey to the "garbage-in, garbage-out" syndrome of the computer age.

Federal immigration reforms will require evaluations of the new immigration legislation.(111) Such studies would do well to examine the history of the data quest in San Diego County, taking particular note of the temptation to use selective (racial) profiles as a weak substitute for methodologically sounder techniques.

Cost/benefit analysis. This paper has been reluctant to total up the costs and benefits of undocumented immigration into San Diego County. The reasons are several: 1) no one study has a complete inventory of costs and benefits; 2) the "findings" from one study cannot be added to those of another study because the assumptions used are significantly different; 3) changes in government agency behavior towards counting undocumented persons (such as the new effort by police agencies to identify the costs of undocumented persons on the criminal justice system and the enumeration of undocumented persons by the State Department of Finance as part of the official count of California population growth); and, 4) an obsessive focus on "fiscal" impacts obscures the "human" impacts of this phenomenon.

Nevertheless, the exercise of reviewing each area of the local economy and social system with respect to the undocumented population is a valuable activity. There are important questions that require reliable and valid, or useable, impact data to answer a number of questions adequately: How is this influx of individuals changing the fabric of society? Is it really that different from any other surge of new immigrants? How does it relate to growth of the combined area of San Diego and Tijuana, the world's largest binational metropolitan region encompassing First and Third World cities?

The attempt to conduct a cost/benefit analysis should be pursued, not
only for bottom-line numbers, but also as a vehicle to help us rethink the evolving equation of what America is and how it is supposed to function. This paper has outlined some of the pitfalls in making that effort overly simplistic.

- Integrating diverse methodologies. The 1980 County study and the follow-up study by Community Research Associates throw some light on the attempt by two research firms--one with an anthropological perspective, the other with an economic one--to produce an interdisciplinary understanding of undocumented immigration into San Diego. The intellectual dynamic pitted the importance of solving an econometric problem against an ethnographic account of employer practices. These interests need not be opposed, but in the evolution of this research it was difficult to recognize how various pieces of data should be put together. In this instance, the econometric approach dominated the understanding of economic impacts and job displacement (the 1980 County study)(112); in the latter study, the ethnographic analysis of employer perceptions prevailed. However, upon reflection and further discussion, it is possible to see more clearly how these disciplines can coordinate their respective strengths in analyzing major issues that remain, such as the absorptive capacity of the regional economy, industry flexibility in the choice between domestic and foreign labor, and the question of industry's labor force needs.

A research design can be built on the interaction of anthropological and economic methods (as well as those of sister disciplines). However, recognition must be given to disciplinary differences. In this instance, the difference is obviously tied to ethnographic and far more qualitative research methods in anthropology; economists lean more to quantitative, aggregate analyses. Another point of difference is the question of rationality in decision making: Anthropologists analyze "rationality"
within the cultural- and psychological-belief system of the individual; economists, by contrast, generally hold such variation constant, thereby permitting interpretations which impute rationality to the outcomes of the market place.

The interaction between these two disciplines is also important in examining industry segmentation, particularly as it involves what employers would do if they had to shift to domestic labor after having employed undocumented workers. The employer's decision context for employment is a complex one; it is a configuration of social, cultural, and economic elements woven together in a highly personal and "subjective" fashion. There must be room, as it were, in the analytic framework, to allow for mistakes, discrimination, and bad decisions, as well as "rational" decisions and luck. This point of departure does not conflict with econometric oriented studies, but rather informs such studies, particularly where statistical data are few and/or where such data are ill-attuned to the way in which social reality is interpreted by the actual participants--be their role ethnic group member, employer or employee, or policy maker.

CONCLUSION

A regional approach to U.S.-Mexican border dynamics is singularly important. For San Diegans, the importance lies in developing a consciousness about how border relationships are transacted and how each side influences each other. The issue of undocumented immigration has been important to San Diego policy makers. A more mature methodology will be important in determining the next step of local government units vis-à-vis federal ones. On the national level, it is important to project the quite distinct nature of San Diego as a border community. This segment of the border requires its own intellectual stamp, much as the Texas vision, the
Florida vision, and a Kansas vision of immigration has its own distinct character. Finally, the attempt to forge new federal immigration legislation will eventually be achieved. When that occurs, it will be useful for national level policy makers to understand where regional differences fit into their policy perspective.
APPENDIX 1


8. Health Problems and Health Service Utilization Among Mexican Immigrants: The Case of San Diego, A Report to the California Policy Seminar, Cornelius, Wayne A., Chavez, Leo R., and Jones, Oliver W., 1982 (Draft). [Citations in this paper are from the revised 1984 version.]


13. Budget Hearings, June 17, 1986: San Diego Police Department, Memo from Remigia Bermudez to Deputy Mayor Ed Struiksma, City of San Diego: June 10, 1986. (Note: This memo incorporates complaints submitted by the Coalition for Law and Justice.)


In Progress


Preliminary Reports:


TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1977

RESOLUTION RE FEDERAL REIMBURSEMENT FOR MEDICAL SERVICES RENDERED TO NON-RESIDENT ALIENS

On Motion of Supervisor Taylor, seconded by Supervisor Moore, the following Resolution is adopted:

WHEREAS, the population of non-resident aliens within the United States has been estimated between six and seven million people; and
WHEREAS, the non-resident alien population is increasing by 500,000 to 1,000,000 persons per year; and
WHEREAS, the federal government retains total authority on immigration and deportations; and
WHEREAS, county government has no control over the number of non-resident aliens residing within their jurisdiction; and
WHEREAS, large numbers of these non-resident aliens require emergency medical services for which counties must bear much of the costs; and
WHEREAS, recovery of costs to the County of San Diego have remained very unsuccessful; and
WHEREAS, the cost of emergency medical services to non-resident aliens is increasing the already heavy burden borne by County taxpayers;

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the County of San Diego strongly urges Congress to enact legislation providing for federal reimbursement for emergency medical services provided to non-resident aliens.

PASSED AND ADOPTED by the Board of Supervisors of the County of San Diego, State of California, this 22nd day of February, 1977, by the following vote:

AYES: Supervisors Hamilton, Moore, Hedgecock, Bates and Taylor

NOES: Supervisors None

ABSENT: Supervisors None

STATE OF CALIFORNIA )
County of San Diego ) ss.

I, PORTER D. CREMANS, Clerk of the Board of Supervisors of the County of San Diego, State of California, hereby certify that I have compared the foregoing copy with the original resolution passed and adopted by said Board, at a regular meeting thereof, at the time and by the vote therein stated, which original resolution is now on file in my office; that the same contains a full, true and correct transcript therefrom and of the whole thereof.

Witness my hand and the seal of said Board of Supervisors, this 22nd day of February, 1977.

PORTER D. CREMANS
Clerk of the Board of Supervisors

By Irene Guss ________________
Deputy

71
9] Replace de-annualized workers in total # of 15-18 year olds.  
    1,603 - 916 = 687
    +1,106 = 1,793

10] Add 15-18 year olds to above 64 and below 15.  
    64+  15  = 148
    (i.e. under 18) 15-18 1,793 = 3,478
    0-14  6,428 = 12,446

11] Fraction of population under 18 and over 64  
    8,236 = 16,072

12] Percent of total undocumented outside of CRA/1979 total  
    34.1% = 33.2%

13] If flow is uniform for all age groups, then we can assume an additional amount beyond the State's 4,400. Let us assume half-way between 33.2% (high) and 34.1% (low) of CRA study total, which is 33.7%.  

14] Thus, total flow since 1980  
    4,400 x 5.75 years since 1980 census = 25,300
    2,200 x 5.75 years since 1980 census = 12,650

    Total Flow = 37,950 -- rounded off to 38,000

15] Census Bureau estimate in 1980 = 50,000

16] July, 1986 total = 88,000
APPENDIX 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Price</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table is incomplete and requires additional data to be filled in.
## Impact Analysis

**Employment-Related Migration**  
(1,000 per year)

### % Impact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Short Term (1 to 5 years)</th>
<th>Long Term (10 to 15 years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>.05 to .33</td>
<td>.56 to .77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>.02 to .28</td>
<td>.43 to .57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td>.60 to 1.17</td>
<td>2.01 to 2.50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Out-Migration</td>
<td>0.00 to .61</td>
<td>1.14 to 1.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Personal Income</td>
<td>0.00 to .25</td>
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<tr>
<td>Per Capita Real Personal Income</td>
<td>-.05 to -.08</td>
<td>-.16 to -.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real Transfer Payments</td>
<td>.05 to .22</td>
<td>.43 to .63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Real Transfer Payments</td>
<td>0.00 to -.11</td>
<td>-.14 to -.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>0.00 to -.03</td>
<td>-.08 to -.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>.06 to .98</td>
<td>1.01 to 1.21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>0.00 to .16</td>
<td>.27 to .36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Retail</td>
<td>.01 to .26</td>
<td>.45 to .58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>.01 to .25</td>
<td>.42 to .58</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## Impact Analysis

### Employment-Related Migration

(10,000 per year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Short Term (1 to 5 years)</th>
<th>Long Term (10 to 15 years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>.5 to 3.71</td>
<td>6.01 to 8.13</td>
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<td>Employment</td>
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<td>Unemployment</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.00 to .18</td>
<td>10.69 to 14.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Personal Income</td>
<td>.22 to 2.97</td>
<td>4.66 to 6.28</td>
</tr>
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<td>Per Capita Real Personal Income</td>
<td>-.31 to -.71</td>
<td>-1.27 to -1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Transfer Payments</td>
<td>.03 to 1.97</td>
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<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>2.66 to 2.30</td>
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<td>Construction</td>
<td>2.81 to 11.87</td>
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<td>Manufacturing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Services</td>
<td>.89 to 3.75</td>
<td>5.30 to 6.83</td>
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</table>
1. See Figure 1 in text for a list of studies requested by the County Board of Supervisors. See Appendix 1 for an inventory of San Diego-related studies on undocumented immigration.


5. County of San Diego, Inter-Department Correspondence, "Work Plan - Non-Resident Alien Impact Study," from Assistant Chief Administrative Officer, Human Resources Agency, to Board of Supervisors, July 29, 1975, p. 1.

6. Letter from Peter Schabarum, Supervisor, First District, County of Los Angeles to Lou Conde, Chairman, San Diego County Board of Supervisors, "Re: Medical Care for Illegal Aliens," September 27, 1974.

7. Ideally, the work of the Border Task Force would have followed the research of the independent-contracted study; however, since the Board of Supervisors intended to present their recommendations to the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy in San Francisco, June 9-10, 1980, the time-line forced both the research and policy efforts to run parallel to one another.

8. Board of Supervisors, "Resolution re federal reimbursement for medical services rendered to non-resident aliens," County of San Diego, February 22, 1977. Passed 5-0.


10. The case was dismissed on February 6, 1980, and subsequently denied by the U.S. Court of Appeal, October 16, 1981, and the U.S. Supreme Court, March 22, 1982.

Note: A comparison might be drawn with the City of San Diego's attempt to seek a larger reimbursement for the costs of treating Tijuana sewage. The City seeks both Congressional assistance as well as contemplated legal action against the United States government for breach of contract. The City Attorney recommended against legal action. In both this instance and that of the County's lawsuit on immigration issues, the dual definition of border issues as simultaneously local and national in character creates an ambiguous situation for fiscal and
moral responsibility. For City of San Diego actions, see "Resolution Number 259133, August 22, 1983," and "Memorandum of Law, Contract Between The City of San Diego and the United States of America under which the City is to Provide Emergency Sewage Service to the City of Tijuana, Mexico," to R.W. King, Water Utilities Director, October 16, 1981.


12. Williams, Leon, "Statement of the Honorable Leon Williams, Chairman, Board of Supervisors, County of San Diego, California before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, U.S. House of Representatives, on behalf of the National Association of Counties," Washington, D.C., September 11, 1985, pp. 3-5.


18. Williams, Leon, "Statement of the Honorable Leon Williams, Chairman, Board of Supervisors, County of San Diego, California before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law, U.S. House of Representatives, on behalf of the National Association of Counties," p. 4.

19. Two illustrations of reactions by researchers against the pressure to state absolute undocumented-immigrant counts are:

1) Interdepartment Correspondence from Vic Villalpando to Ruben Dominguez, Assistant CAO, County of San Diego, March 17, 1977:

   The "covert" nature of the illegal alien population does not lend itself to a conventional "scientific research" approach. The data base for the results was simply obtained from all available and best source data banks.

   It appears that the only error in judgement was being "honest" by stating that some of the data contained in Section A of the report is a "best guess estimate." Next time we'll do what the U.S. Census
Bureau does and not qualify any portion of our data as an "estimate."

I believe that the report qualified its position well. All experts who I conferred with during the compilation verified the methodology as appropriate to the circumstances. And those who have read it accept it with the qualification that my kind of study conducted for the purpose of determining an illegal alien count will always produce an "estimate."


We have unfortunately been unable to arrive at definite estimates of the number of illegal residents in the United States or of the magnitude of the illegal migration flow. The phenomenon we have sought to measure, by its nature, is not an easy one to deal with. Researchers and policy makers will have to live with the fact that the number of illegal residents in the United States cannot be closely quantified. Therefore, policy options dependent on the size of this group must be evaluated in terms which recognize this uncertainty.


21. A "sample" of apprehension forms (INS 213) can be drawn and statistically analyzed to gain an understanding of the total universe of apprehension forms. However, when this "sample" and the total universe of apprehension forms are considered in relation to the actual undocumented-immigrant population, these data are rendered into a "study population" without a clear and definitive relationship to the actual undocumented population universe. A study conducted for the Southwest Border Regional Commission relied on this approach and as would be expected qualified its conclusions accordingly: "Though this sample strictly represents only the characteristics of undocumented immigrants apprehended in the California border region, the findings nevertheless contain implications for undocumented migration in the country generally."


25. Planners at the City of San Diego were surprised to find several hundred group quarter residents counted in the 1980 Census for the Rancho Penasquitos area. The Bureau of the Census' regional manager pointed out that these individuals were undocumented farm workers living in minimal housing structures, but counted as individuals in group quarters. George Ormond, personal communication, City of San Diego Planning Department, April, 1983.


30. Ibid., p. 4.

31. Ibid., p. 2.


34. Estimate developed by Joseph Nalven, July 1986. Some limitations of this estimate are:

A) This total represents a 76% population increase in 5.75 years, or a 13.2% average annual increase. San Diego County's overall annual population increase has fluctuated around 2.2% per annum. Relative to San Diego's increase, the rate of growth for the undocumented population may appear to be high. By contrast, the General Accounting Office study (see note 35) estimates a 20% growth in the undocumented population in San Diego County from 1980 through mid-1984, or an average annual growth rate of about 5%.
B) Given the increase in Border Patrol apprehensions in the San Diego area, now over 400,000 per year, one can surmise an immigration pressure on San Diego County:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Approaches</th>
<th>Per cent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FY 1980</td>
<td>285,984</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>326,836</td>
<td>+ 14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>314,979</td>
<td>- 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>429,121</td>
<td>+ 36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>407,828</td>
<td>- 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>427,772</td>
<td>+ 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986 (10 months only)</td>
<td>527,000</td>
<td>+ 23%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The actual number of persons involved in the apprehensions is lower. One study estimated an average of 1.89 apprehensions per person. Even if one allows that the great majority are headed to points north of San Diego, there is still reason to pay attention to this immigration dynamic. "Got-away" estimates are even more problematical. Border Patrol personnel argue that they fail to completely stop the flow of undocumented persons. Although the entry flow is unknown, a realistic assessment of the entry pressure by EWIs (Entered Without Inspection) and by visa abusers would justify support of a higher growth percentage of undocumented persons than the overall San Diego population.

Two additional factors suggest that the Mexican-origin population, distributed across both Californias, is growing at a disproportionately faster rate than the non-Mexican-origin population in this region. The fertility rate of Latinos (dominated by a Mexican-origin component) is significantly higher (3.2) than it is for Anglos (1.4), Blacks (1.8), and Asian & other non-Latinos (1.8). See David Hayes- Bautista, Werner Schinck, and Jorge Chapa "The Young Latino Population and the Future of an Aging American Society: The Next Ten Years," (unpublished paper, n.d., about 1985). Also, San Diego's neighboring city of Tijuana is growing about 2 to 3 times as fast as San Diego, indicating a tremendous growth pressure within Mexico itself in this same border region.


37. Ibid., p. 12.


40. Ibid., p. B-10.

41. San Diego Police Department, "Quarterly Crime Briefing," presented to the Public Services and Safety Committee, City of San Diego, August 6, 1986, p. 3.


43. Ibid., pp.72-78.

44. Ibid., p.79.


46. Ibid., pp. 151-2.

47. Glen, Kim, City of San Diego Police Department, personal communication, May, 1986.


50. Ibid.


53. Ibid. (Since November 15, 1985 for the City of San Diego and since January 1, 1986 for the County Sheriff's Department.)


57. Ibid.


61. Ibid., p. 97

62. Ibid., p. 12.

63. William Townsend, Department of Public Health, County of San Diego, personal communication, September 3, 1986.


72. Cornelius, Wayne A., Chavez, Leo R., and Jones, Oliver W., "Health Problems and Health Service Utilization Among Mexican Immigrants: The Case of San Diego."

73. A discussion of individuals who were applying for legal status under the Silva-Bell decision indicated that their rate of AFDC utilization was similar to the overall rate in the general population. Community Research Associates, "Undocumented Immigrants: Their Impact on the County of San Diego," p. 187.


75. Human Resources Agency, "A Study of the Impact of Illegal Aliens on the County of San Diego on Specific Socioeconomic Areas," p. 53. Note that although a court decision voided the requirement of the County Boards of Supervisors to forward the names of N/I/NC children to the I.N.S., there was still an uneasiness since the students still had to be identified for reimbursement purposes. Discussion is found in Human Resources Agency, "Impact of Illegal Aliens on the County of San Diego," pp. 146-148. State law on this point finally changed in 1978, voiding the requirement to identify these children. S.B. 1432, September 19, 1978, as discussed in Community Research Associates, "Undocumented Immigrants: Their Impact on the County of San Diego," pp. 138-139.

76. Golding, Susan, "Proposal to be heard by the Board [of Supervisors] on Tuesday, June 24, [1986]," County of San Diego.


80. Ibid., p. 42.

82. Ibid., p. 129.


84. Ibid., p. 91.

85. Ibid., p. 92.

86. Ibid., p. 186-187.


89. Ibid.


91. Chojnicki, Doris, Doctolerow, Agnes, and Higuchi, Paul, personal communication on subventions based on per capita, State Controller's Office, Sacramento, August 11, 1986. Table developed by Joseph Nalven.


96. Ibid., pp. 51, 53.


101. Approval of Agenda Item No. 53, "Recommends that a guest worker program be accepted in principle..." Vote 4-0, May 27, 1980, (Cited in Inter-Departmental Correspondence, June 4, 1980, To Board of Supervisors from Clifford Graves, "Feasibility of Border Task Force Local Policy Recommendations."


107. This observation is directed specifically to the essays describing the project on the role of Mexican labor in the California labor markets. See note 93.


112. The use of a model to simulate the effects of this population as a "shock" to the local economy, together with a subsequent critique of this approach, is unique among existing studies. Chiswick has noted that "studying the economy-wide impacts of any policy or economic phenomenon has proved at best a very difficult task." (Chiswick, Barry, "Some Issues for Analyses of the Labor Market Impact of Immigrants," Paper prepared for the Rockefeller Foundation Workshop on the Labor Market Impacts of Immigration, August 3-6, 1982, Wingspread Conference Center, Racine, Wisconsin, p. 4.)

Part of this difficulty has been analyses which employ a zero-sum approach to impacts on the labor market (which omit the job-creation effect of immigrant expenditures), as well as analyses which fail to examine how wage-depression effects might lead to an indirect increase in the use of transfer payments by the native population. (Chiswick, Ibid., pp. 6, 7.) The dearth of studies on economy-wide impacts is further underscored by Greenwood, who calls for more study of locational factors in analyzing regional economic aspects of immigration. Greenwood argues that "faster-growing regions may have greater employment consequences ... [because immigrant location] may cause more demand-induced investment expenditures when housing and public capital are in relatively short supply." (Greenwood, Michael, "Regional Economic Aspects of Immigrant Location Patterns in the United States," (In) U.S. Immigration and Refugee Policy: Global and Domestic Issues, (Ed) Kritz, Mary, Lexington Books, Lexington, 1983, p. 245.) Notes on the calculation of undocumented persons above 64 and below 18 to add to 18-64 estimated flow into San Diego County by State Department of Finance.